



# 云原生应用程序安全交付指南

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2023 第八届中国开源年会

开源：川流不息、山海相映

# 目录

CONTENTS

01

云原生 & 安全概览

02

云原生应用安全交付的实践思路

03

AIGC 浪潮下的应用安全思考



173

218K

14.7M

190

1260

4.07M

Type: 安全性 | Security [[Clear Filter](#)]

Wednesday, September 27

11:00am CST

自动化云原生应用的零信任 | Automating Zero-Trust for Cloud Native Applications - Raul Mahiques &amp; Erin Quill, SUSE

3层 301明珠厅| 3F THE PEARL HALL 301

11:50am CST

CoCo-AS: CNCF的首个保密计算认证解决方案 | CoCo-as: First Confidential Computing Attestation Solution of CNCF - Jia Le Zhang, Alibaba Cloud &amp; Dave Chen, Arm Limited

3层 301明珠厅| 3F THE PEARL HALL 301

1:55pm CST

In-toto: 保护云原生和机密容器中的软件供应链 | In-Toto: Protecting Software Supply Chain in Cloud Native and Application in Confidential Containers - Justin Cappos, NYU

3层 301明珠厅| 3F THE PEARL HALL 301

2:45pm CST

后利用被入侵的ETCD | Post-Exploiting a Compromised ETCD - Luis Toro Puig, NCC Group

3层 301明珠厅| 3F THE PEARL HALL 301

3:50pm CST

服务感知的零信任容器网络及其向DPU的卸载 | Service Aware Zero Trust Container Network and Its Offloading to DPU - Arthur Xiang, Digitalchina

3层 301明珠厅| 3F THE PEARL HALL 301

4:40pm CST

使用Notary项目、ORAS和Harbor来保障CI/CD中的容器供应链安全 | Securing Container Supply Chain in CI/CD with Notary Project, ORAS and Harbor - Yan Wang, VMWare; Yi Zha, Microsoft

3夹层 3M3会议室 | 3M ROOM 3M3



Type: 供应链安全 | Supply Chain Security [[Clear Filter](#)]

Wednesday, September 27



11:00am CST

使用Kyverno和Notary在GitOps中摆脱安全链攻击 | Kicking Security Chain Attacks to the Curb with Kyverno and Notary in GitOps - Shuting Zhao, Nirmata &amp; Feynman Zhou, Microsoft

3夹层 3M1会议室 | 3M ROOM 3M1




# DevSecOps：应用程序安全交付新范式



```
deployment.yml

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: coscon-deployment
  labels:
    app: curl
spec:
  replicas: 3
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: curl
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: curl
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: curl
          image: dllhb/devsecops-curl:4.0.0
          ports:
            - containerPort: 80
          env:
            - name: USERNAME
              value: "xiaomage"
            - name: PASSWORD
              value: "HelloCosCon@2023"
```

snappyf.com



# 深度 + 广度：纵深防御



Single source truth of source code

Code Review

Audit

Secret Detection

SCA

XAST

Fuzzing testing

Pen testing

License compliance

Dockerfile best practice

Audit

Image scanning

Image signature



RBAC Network Policy


Audit

Resource limit

etcd enforce










**sigstore  
cosign**



cosign

```
$ cosign sign --key cosign.key dllhb/go-demo:v1.0.0
Enter password for private key:
Pushing signature to: index.docker.io/dllhb/go-demo
snappyf.com
```

cosign

```
$ cosign verify --key cosign.pub dllhb/go-demo:v1.0.0 | jq .
Verification for index.docker.io/dllhb/go-demo:v1.0.0 --
The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:
- The cosign claims were validated
- The signatures were verified against the specified public key
- Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.
[
  {
    "critical": {
      "identity": {
        "docker-reference": "index.docker.io/dllhb/go-demo"
      },
      "image": {
        "docker-manifest-digest": "sha256:888988496480bb0be8984b43a84970589e41110a2d25440f145031fd396dd2db"
      },
      "type": "cosign container image signature"
    },
    "optional": null
  }
]
```

cosign

```
$ cosign verify --key cosign.pub dllhb/go-demo:v1.0.0 | jq .
Error: no matching signatures:

main.go:46: error during command execution: no matching signatures:
snappyf.com
```



syft-sbom

syft packages `dllhb/curl-devsecops:4.0.0`  
New version of syft is available: `0.94.0`

- ✓ Parsed image
- ✓ Cataloged packages [19 packages]

NAME	VERSION	TYPE
alpine-baselayout	<code>3.2.0-r16</code>	apk
alpine-keys	<code>2.4-r0</code>	apk
apk-tools	<code>2.12.7-r0</code>	apk
brotli-libs	<code>1.0.9-r5</code>	apk
busybox	<code>1.33.1-r8</code>	apk
ca-certificates	<code>20230506-r0</code>	apk
ca-certificates-bundle	<code>20220614-r0</code>	apk
curl	<code>8.0.1-r0</code>	apk
libc-utils	<code>0.7.2-r3</code>	apk
libcrypto1_1	<code>1.1.1t-r2</code>	apk
libcurl	<code>8.0.1-r0</code>	apk
libretls	<code>3.3.3p1-r3</code>	apk
libssl1.1	<code>1.1.1t-r2</code>	apk
musl	<code>1.2.2-r4</code>	apk
musl-utils	<code>1.2.2-r4</code>	apk
nghttp2-libs	<code>1.43.0-r0</code>	apk
scanelf	<code>1.3.2-r0</code>	apk
ssl_client	<code>1.33.1-r8</code>	apk
zlib	<code>1.2.12-r3</code>	apk

snappyf.com

## curl vulnerability

CVE-2023-38545

CVE-2023-38546


CLI & libcurl  
(7.69.0 to 8.3.0)

libcurl  
(7.9.1 to 8.3.0)

# AIGC 浪潮下的应用安全思考



## AIGC 降低了漏洞修复，安全落地的门槛



```
test.js

1 const express = require('express');
2 const app = express();
3 const port = 3000;
4
5 // 不安全：直接调用 eval 解析 json，有安全漏洞，触发静态代码扫描告警
6 const sUserInput = getURLParam("json_val");
7 const jsonstr1 = `{"name":"a","company":"b","value":${sUserInput}}`;
8 const json1 = eval(`(${jsonstr1})`);
9
10 // Static Files
11 app.use(express.static('public'));
12 app.use('/css', express.static(__dirname + 'public/css'));
13 app.use('/js', express.static(__dirname + 'public/js'));
14 app.use('/img', express.static(__dirname + 'public/img'));
15
16
17 // Listen on port 3000
18 app.listen(port, () => console.info(`Listening on port ${port}`));
19
20 const email_validator = require('./email_validator.js');
21 email_validator('workshop@jihulab.com')
22
```

届中国开源年会

**CVE** Go to for: CVSS Scores CPE Info

CVE List Downloads Data Feeds Update a CVE Record Request CVE IDs

TOTAL CVE Records: 200731

NOTICE: Transition to the all-new CVE website at [WWW.CVE.ORG](http://WWW.CVE.ORG) and [CVE Record Format JSON](#) are underway.

NOTICE: Changes are coming to [CVE List Content Downloads](#) in 2023.

HOME > CVE > CVE-2021-44832

[Printer-Friendly View](#)

**CVE-ID** [Learn more at National Vulnerability Database \(NVD\)](#)

**CVE-2021-44832** • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

**Description**  
Apache Log4j versions 2.0-beta7 through 2.17.0 (excluding security fix releases 2.3.2 and 2.12.4) are vulnerable to a remote code execution (RCE) attack when a configuration uses a JDBC Appender with a JNDI LDAP data source URI when an attacker has control of the target LDAP server. This issue is fixed by limiting JNDI data source names to the java protocol in Log4j2 versions 2.17.1, 2.12.4, and 2.3.2.

**References**  
Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

- CISCO:20211210 Vulnerabilities in Apache Log4j Library Affecting Cisco Products: December 2021  
[URL:https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-apache-log4j-qRuKNFbd](https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-apache-log4j-qRuKNFbd)  
CONFIRM:<https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-784507.pdf>  
[URL:https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-784507.pdf](https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-784507.pdf)  
CONFIRM:<https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220104-0001/>  
[URL:https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220104-0001/](https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220104-0001/)  
FEDORA:FEDORA-2021-1bd9151bab  
[URL:https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T57MPJUW3MA6QGWZRTMCHHMMMPQNVKGFC/](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/T57MPJUW3MA6QGWZRTMCHHMMMPQNVKGFC/)  
FEDORA:FEDORA-2021-c6f471ce0f  
[URL:https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EVV25FXL4FU5X6XBSL7RLQ7T6F65MRA/](https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EVV25FXL4FU5X6XBSL7RLQ7T6F65MRA/)  
MISC:<https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3293>  
[MISC:https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3293](https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-3293)  
MISC:<https://lists.apache.org/thread/s1o5vl078ypqxnzn6p8z6t9shq5143>  
[URL:https://lists.apache.org/thread/s1o5vl078ypqxnzn6p8z6t9shq5143](https://lists.apache.org/thread/s1o5vl078ypqxnzn6p8z6t9shq5143)  
MISC:<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html>  
[URL:https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2022.html)  
MISC:<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cupjan2022.html>  
[URL:https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cupjan2022.html](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cupjan2022.html)  
MISC:<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/coujan2022.html>  
[URL:https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/coujan2022.html](https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/coujan2022.html)  
MLIST:[debian-lts-announce] 20211229 [SECURITY] [DLA 2870-1] apache-log4j2 security update



test.js

```
1 const express = require('express');
2 const app = express();
3 const port = 3000;
4
5 // 不安全: 直接调用 eval 解析 json, 有安全漏洞, 触发静态代码扫描告警
6 const sUserInput = getURLParam("json_val");
7 const jsonstr1 = `{"name":"a","company":"b","value":${sUserInput}}`;
8 const json1 = eval(`(${jsonstr1})`);
9
10 // Static Files
11 app.use(express.static('public'));
12 app.use('/css', express.static(__dirname + 'public/css'));
13 app.use('/js', express.static(__dirname + 'public/js'));
14 app.use('/img', express.static(__dirname + 'public/img'));
15
16
17 // Listen on port 3000
18 app.listen(port, () => console.info(`Listening on port ${port}`));
19
20 const email_validator = require('./email_validator.js');
21 email_validator('workshop@jihulab.com')
22
```

J

please find the vulnerability in below code

...

```
const express = require('express');
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
```

```
// 不安全: 直接调用 eval 解析 json, 有安全漏洞, 触发静态代码扫描告警
const sUserInput = getURLParam("json_val");
const jsonstr1 = `{"name":"a","company":"b","value":${sUserInput}}`;
const json1 = eval(`(${jsonstr1})`);
```

```
// Static Files
app.use(express.static('public'));
app.use('/css', express.static(__dirname + 'public/css'));
app.use('/js', express.static(__dirname + 'public/js'));
app.use('/img', express.static(__dirname + 'public/img'));
```

```
// Listen on port 3000
app.listen(port, () => console.info(` Listening on port ${port}`));
```

```
const email_validator = require('./email_validator.js');
email_validator('workshop@jihulab.com')
...
```



在提供的代码中, 我们可以看到以下漏洞:

1. eval函数调用: 代码中使用eval函数解析JSON字符串, 这种做法是不安全的。因为使用eval函数可以执行任意的JavaScript代码, 攻击者可以利用这个函数注入恶意代码, 从而造成安全漏洞。
2. 未对输入进行验证: 代码中的sUserInput变量从getURLParam函数中获取, 但是并未对其进行任何的输入验证或过滤, 这可能导致诸如跨站脚本攻击 (XSS) 等问题。
3. 未使用HTTPS: 代码中未使用HTTPS协议进行通信, 这可能会导致数据在传输过程中被窃听或篡改, 造成安全风险。



test.js

```
1 const express = require('express');
2 const app = express();
3 const port = 3000;
4
5 // 不安全: 直接调用 eval 解析 json, 有安全漏洞, 触发静态代码扫描告警
6 const sUserInput = getURLParam("json_val");
7 const jsonstr1 = `{"name": "a", "company": "b", "value": "${sUserInput}"}`;
8 const json1 = eval(`(${jsonstr1})`);
9
10 // Static Files
11 app.use(express.static('public'));
12 app.use('/css', express.static(__dirname + 'public/css'));
13 app.use('/js', express.static(__dirname + 'public/js'));
14 app.use('/img', express.static(__dirname + 'public/img'));
15
16
17 // Listen on port 3000
18 app.listen(port, () => console.info(`Listening on port ${port}`));
19
20 const email_validator = require('./email_validator.js');
21 email_validator('workshop@jihulab.com')
22
```

Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')

状态: Detected

说明: Detected eval(variable), which could allow a malicious actor to run arbitrary code.

项目: [demo-show / dev-sec-ops-devsecops](#)

文件: [app.js:8](#)

标识: [eslint.detect-eval-with-expression](#), [CWE-95](#), [A1 - Injection](#), ESLint rule ID security/detect-eval-with-expression

严重级别: ▼ 中

工具: SAST

扫描工具提供者: Semgrep

取消 忽略漏洞 创建议题

流水线 #1127050 已通过 使用提交 30efb250 于 sast-demo 刚刚

需要 2 个来自 Security Approve 的批准。

核准人	核准	已评论	已核准人
所有符合条件的用户	可选		

Security Approve

0 / 2

其余1项

安全扫描检测到1个潜在的漏洞 0个严重, 0个高危 以及 其他1项

SAST检测到1个潜在的漏洞 0个严重, 0个高危 以及 其他1项

新增

中 Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')

.gitlab-ci.yml

```
include:
  - template: Security/SAST.gitlab-ci.yml

stages:
  - test
```

下面是改进后的代码示例：

编辑

代码

...

```
php

const express = require('express');
const app = express();
const port = 3000;

// 安全：使用JSON.parse()代替eval函数
const sUserInput = getURLParam("json_val");
const jsonstr1 = `{"name":"a","company":"b","value":${sUserInput}}`;
const json1 = JSON.parse(jsonstr1);

// 对输入进行验证和过滤
function getURLParam(param) {
  const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
  const value = urlParams.get(param);
  return value ? value.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '') : '';
}

// Static Files
app.use(express.static('public'));
app.use('/css', express.static(__dirname + 'public/css'));
app.use('/js', express.static(__dirname + 'public/js'));
app.use('/img', express.static(__dirname + 'public/img'));

// 使用HTTPS协议
const fs = require('fs');
const https = require('https');
const options = {
  key: fs.readFileSync('server.key'),
  cert: fs.readFileSync('server.crt')
};

https.createServer(options, app).listen(port, () => console.info(`Listening

const email_validator = require('./email_validator.js');
email_validator('workshop@jihulab.com');
```

## Update 2 files

开放中 JingHe Ma 请求将 `sast-demo` 合并到 `main` 4分钟前

概览 0 提交 2 流水线 2 变更 2

- ./.gitlab-ci.yml
- /app.js

0 0

流水线 #1127053 已通过 使用提交 3959c13f 于 `sast-demo` 1分钟前



Collapse eligible ap

8 需要 2 个来自 Security Approve 的批准。

核准人

核准 已评论 已核准人

所有符合条件的用户

可选

Security Approve



0 / 2

其余1项

安全扫描 未检测到新漏洞。

完整报告



SAST 未检测到新漏洞。

- 合并受阻：必须获得所有必需的批准。

合并详情

- 2 提交 和 1 个合并提交 将被添加到 `main`。
- 源分支将被删除。



Code Review

Thread Model


Vulnerability  
Identify

Application  
security testing

Security  
Training

.....

Tools  
Suggestion



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<https://levelup.gitconnected.com/complete-chatgpt-guide-for-devsecops-top-20-most-essential-prompts-ef21e0aa4830>





# THANK YOU

QUESTIONS?

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视频号：开源社KAIYUANSHE

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简书：开源社

头条：开源社

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Twitter：开源社KAIYUANSHE



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积分可兑换对应礼品哟！